

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of the Deputy for the
Intelligence Community

6 SEP 1974

DCI/IC 74-2307

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Executive Secretary, PFIAB

1. Attached is a memorandum which launches the USIB Human Sources Committee effort to develop assessments of the reporting performance of US missions as a basis for the letters which Mr. Colby intends to send to the Ambassadors.
2. You will recall that in his discussion with the PFIAB of the Board's Report on Human Source Collection, Mr. Colby said that he would direct the Human Sources Committee to do this.
3. The attached memorandum is provided as an amplification of the concept and as an indication that the Human Sources Committee is moving out on a course of action which is responsive to a number of the PFIAB findings and recommendations.

[REDACTED]

Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: a/s

*Also on sending along the letter of instruction
will be provided the HSC chairman and on
which 2/26/74 will evaluate
HSC progress.*

for

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Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000900190002-5

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[redacted]
[redacted]
Associate Deputy to the DCI
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Attachment: a/s

DCI/IC/CS/S/[redacted] saw (30 Aug 74)

Distribution:

- 0 - Addee w/att
- ✓ 1 - IC Reg w/att
- 1 - CS Subj. w/att
- 1 - CS Chrono w/att
- 1 - [redacted] chrono w/att

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
HUMAN SOURCES COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

HSC-C-078

21 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HUMAN SOURCES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Perspectives Concerning Committee Activities

Based on his recent discussions with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Director of Central Intelligence has asked the Committee to assist in realizing the full potential of the human source collection community to contribute to national intelligence. Inherent in this objective is the task of causing the aggregate of human source collection elements to function more as a single national asset rather than a group of autonomous entities.

In moving toward this overall objective, the Committee should consider not only the DCI's Key Intelligence Questions for 1975, but also relevant management objectives derived from the DCI's Perspectives for Intelligence--1975 to 1980 and in his FY 1975 Objectives, such as:

- Achievement of an optimum interrelationship between overt and clandestine human source collection.
- Refinement of requirements and evaluation systems to ensure the application of resources to priority needs and the most effective distribution of intelligence tasks among components of the community.
- Improvement of substantive communication between human source collectors and production analysts, including the machinery for communicating requirements.
- Greater efficiency in the national/tactical interface as it pertains to human source collection.

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With respect to these objectives, human source collection functions as a continuing cycle of communication between intelligence analysts and those collecting and reporting information. In theory and by tradition, the cycle often is viewed as a simple and orderly process which must begin with the analyst writing precise requirements tailored to each collector's assigned mission and geared to the realities of his operational environment. Conceptually, each collection manager then uses these requirements as base-line substantive guidance to task his resources, who acquire sources to report the needed information. In turn, the source reporting is evaluated, the performance of the collector is assessed, resource adjustments are effected, and the cycle starts over.

This simple theoretical approach, however, differs considerably from the complexities involved in the management and operation of the overall multi-agency human source collection and reporting effort. Complicating the development of a mechanism with which to ensure an optimum interrelationship among various community elements concerned with guiding and operating human source collection and reporting--both overt and clandestine--are a number of factors, such as:

- In the absence of good communication among themselves and all community collectors, the Washington analyst of the production community has difficulty in sorting out those specific collection entities which can best act on each of his information needs.
- Consequently, the analytical community as a whole is not well equipped to ensure that its requirements and other substantive guidance is sharply tailored and directed specifically to the most appropriate field collector.
- There is a plethora of guides, manuals, and lists aimed at everyone in general and no one in particular in the collection community.
- Provisions for continuing dialogue among Washington collection managers are inadequate for the purpose of ensuring the most appropriate and effective distribution of collection tasks among the respective elements of the human source collection community.

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- The collective reporting capability of a US diplomatic post is derived from a variety of human source field entities at the post, each tasked, directed, and evaluated by a different Washington collection manager.
- These field entities often collect and report on the same substantive questions or targets but, with some exceptions, there are few provisions for on-post overview of the validity and adequacy of taskings levied on these respective entities.
- The community enjoys no provision for regular assessment of the comparative performance of those respective post elements which are collecting and reporting on matters of common national intelligence concern.
- The lack of such provisions makes it difficult to provide feed-back guidance concerning the most effective distribution of collection tasks at the post, including the optimum relationship between overt and clandestine reporting.

This suggests that in order to develop sensible guidance for all elements collecting and reporting on foreign affairs of US national intelligence concern, we must first develop a fairly clear and precise overview of the comparative performance of these elements. Based on the strengths and deficiencies noted in such performance assessments, we can then feed back to the collector more meaningful guidance tailored to capitalize on reporting strengths and to highlight noted deficiencies to be corrected. All of this, of course, should be carried out with due regard for fundamental functions, lines of authority, and the existing requirements and tasking communications systems for each agency.

Therefore, as a starting point for Committee action in response to the DCI's request and as a continuing base-line effort which will become integral to other on-going and future Committee projects, I propose that the Executive Steering Group immediately develop and present to the Committee an agreed plan of action and a starting schedule of assessments covering:

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- The collective reporting on host country affairs of all appropriate entities at selected US missions and foreign posts. Included would be the reporting of State (plus Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, etc.), DATT, CIA, and other appropriate entities at the post. Also to be considered is the degree to which [] and other peripheral entities contribute to reporting coverage of host country targets.
 - The total community human source responsiveness to national information needs on denied-area hard targets, particularly the USSR and PRC. This will require assessments of collective reporting of all community "peripheral" collection entities, as well as of the US posts in the denied areas, relative to particular key questions against which each of the collectors is working.
 - Military (human source) collection entities which are under the direct management of military services and commands, in terms of performance which contributes to national intelligence and that which serves primarily to satisfy command requirements.

The assessments of performance should become the basis for identifying and communicating to ambassadors, collection program managers, as well as elements of the production community:

- Specific collection and reporting strengths, continuation of which should be encouraged and supported, via the appropriate existing requirements channel, with sharpened feed-back guidance.
- Collection deficiencies and related guidance concerning:
 - . a void or total lack of coverage in reporting which calls for some form of adjustment in resource allocations or taskings;
 - . reporting which is of marginal value to the community's national intelligence production process;
 - . reporting of information which is more readily available in Washington through the press, broadcasts or similar media;

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- Clandestine Service reporting which logically should be covered by overt reporters at the post.

The availability of such a community-wide overview of human source performance should provide an authoritative and informed basis for assisting:

- Chiefs of US diplomatic missions in maximizing overt collection and reporting at the post so as to conserve clandestine assets for that information not available from all other sources.
- The CIA Deputy Director for Operations by defining in meaningful and specific substantive terms those areas on which:
 - overt collection and reporting of information on a country can satisfy a large part of the national requirements but on which certain clandestine collection is required to gain additional perspective or balanced views not available through State and DOD reporting by itself;
 - overt reporting can provide all of the information needed to maintain base line surveillance of affairs in a country, thereby conserving the CIA assets at the post for use against the hard targets (e.g., USSR and PRC).
- The Department of Defense in identifying those military intelligence activities which can and should continue to contribute to common national intelligence concerns and those which are primarily needed to:
 - maintain operational proficiency for use by theater commanders in time of war;
 - report information important to (a) tactical warning and protection of operating military forces or to (b) contingency planning required by JCS readiness requirements on services and commands.
- Other USIB collection committees and community program managers in developing guidance, plans, programs, and tasks for SIGINT, imagery, and other technical collection systems with full consideration to what is being or can be collected by the less costly human source mechanism;


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- National Intelligence Officers, USIB production committees, Operations Centers, and others in developing all-source collection strategies relative to both crisis situations and to selected longer term critical intelligence problems, such as third country nuclear proliferation;
- the Intelligence Community Staff in developing more finite measurements of human source responsiveness to Key Intelligence Questions; in conducting cross-program reviews relative to IRAC issues; and in the reviews of the national-tactical interface among human source collection entities;
- analysts in providing substantive all-source guidance necessary to optimize the complementary effects of on-going collection among human sources and technical collection systems.

These views should not be construed to mean that Committee actions be limited to these assessments. Conversely, I see these assessments as a necessary foundation for the support of other Committee actions related to unifying and improving the overall human source collection effort. In this connection, it would be very helpful if each of you would give me in writing your thoughts and proposals concerning other Committee actions relative to specific problems affecting your respective agencies or the intelligence community as a whole. Armed with these, we will be in a better position to plan the use of our time and energies on future courses of action of the most consequence in improving human source collection.


Chairman

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